Price Doesn’t Matter in VC Deals, But The “Promote” Does
VCs have an unfair advantage when it comes to financings. They simply have more experience doing deals.
A typical start-up company will do 2-4 venture capital financings before a successful exit (or, conversely, an ignomious ending). A typical serial entreprenur may lead 2-3 companies in their career before calling it quits (or checking themselves in to an insane asylum). Thus, the universe of financings that even the most experienced entrepreneurs get directly exposed to is typically 5-10 financings over a 15-20 year career. In contrast, the typical venture capitalist, either individually or across their partnership, will do 5-10 financings in any given year. Year in, year out,
Thus, VCs and entrepreneurs are not operating on an equal playing field when it comes to negotiating financings and interpreting the impact of the terms involved.
One area that has always struck me where this assymetrical relationship comes into sharp focus is when there’s a discussion around the price of the deal. Entrepreneurs often mistakenly focus solely on the pre-money valuation while VCs look at multiple knobs in the negotiation to drive to a set of terms that, in total, they find acceptable. And if they don’t focus on the pre-money, they focus on their ownership position after the financing, irrespecive of the amount of capital that was raised.
In my partnership, we’ve come up with a new term (I think it’s new – I don’t see it written or talked about much) called the “promote” to help communicate with entrepreneurs the real value behind a particular deal so get them to step back from concentrating only on the pre-money valuation or post-money ownership.
What is the promote? First, let me take a step back and define a few terms. In the world of VC-backed financings, there are multiple terms that impact the ultimate price of the deal. The first, and most focused on, is something called the pre-money valuation. That is, what is the company worth prior to the money being invested? This pre-money valuation is own known in shorthand as “the pre” and you will hear entrepreneurs and VCs discussing other company finances using this term (“You were able to raise money at a $9 pre? I had to struggle to get to $6 pre and I have a prototype and real customers! Life isn’t fair.”)
But the pre-money isn’t the only term that defines price, the amount of capital raised and the post-money plays a part as well. The post-money is the pre-money plus the invested capital. That is, if a company raises $4 million at a pre-money valuation of $6 million, then the post-money is $10 million. The investors who provided the $4 million own 40% of the company and the management team owns 60%.
Another term that impacts the price is the size of the option pool. Most VCs invest in companies that need to hire additional management team members and sales and marketing and technical talent to build the business. These new hires typically receive stock options, and the issuance of those stock options dilute the other investors. In anticipation of those hiring needs, many VCs will require that an option pool with unallocated stock options be created prior to the money coming in, thereby forming a stock option budget for new hires that will not require further dilution after the investment. In our $4 million invested in a $6 million pre-money valuation example above (known in VC-speak shorthand as “4 on 6”), if the VCs insist on an unallocated stock option pool of 20%, then the investors still own 40%, there is a 20% unallocated stock option pool at the discretion of the board, and a 40% stake is owned by the management team. In other words, the existing management team/founders have given up 20% points of their ownership in order to go towards future hires.
This relationship between option pool size and price isn’t always understood by entrepreneurs, but is well-understood by VCs. I learned it the hard way in the first term sheet that I put forward to an entrepreneur. I was competing with another firm. We put forward a “6 on 7” deal with a 20% option pool. In other words, we would invest (alongside another VC) $6 million at a $7 million pre-money valuation to own 46% of the company. The founders would own 34% and we would set aside a stock option pool of 20% for future hires. One of my competitors put forward a “6 on 9” deal, in other words $6 million invested at a $9 million pre-money valuation to own 40% of the company. But my competitor inserted a larger option pool than I did – 30% – so the founders would only receive 30% of the company as compared to my deal that gave them 34%. The entrepreneur chose the competing deal. When I asked why he looked me in the eye and said, “Jeff – their price was better. My company is worth more than $7 million”.
At the time, I wasn’t facile enough with the nuances myself to argue against his faulty logic. That’s why we instituted a policy at Flybridge to talk about the “promote” for the founding team more than the “pre”. The “promote”, as we have called it, is the founding team’s ownership percentage multiplied by the post-money valuation. It represents the $ value in the ownership that the founding team is carrying forward after the financing is done.
In my example of the “6 on 7” deal with the 20% option pool, the founding team owns 34% of a company with a $13 million post-money valuation. In other words, they have a $4.4 million “promote” in exchange for their founding contributions. Note that in the “6 on 9” deal, the founding team had a nearly identical promote: 30% of a $15 million post-money valuation, or $4.5 million. In other words, my offer wasn’t different than the competing offer, it just had a smaller pre and a smaller option pool.
Entrepreneurs negotiating with VCs should spend time making sure they understand all of the aspects of the deal, but particularly the elements of price – the pre-money, the post-money, the option pool – and do the simple math to calculate the “promote”. There are many other elements of the deal that affect price (participation, dividends) and control (board composition, protective provisions), but make sure you think hard about the value you’re carrying forward, not just the price tag you think the VC is giving your company in the “pre”.
Jeff is a partner with Boston-based VC firm Flybridge Capital Partners. Read his past peHUB posts, or follow him on Twitter at www.twitter.com/bussgang.
Related posts:

Chris Padfield said on July 15, 2009
This article seems to suggest that the amount of equity going to a VC as opposed to being ringfenced into an options pool makes no difference to the entreprenuer. This is clearly not the case; a large options pool has the advantages to the entrepreneur of:
* Incentivizing people who need to be incentivized by equity (higher exit valuation)
* Preventing further dilution of management if new options are required in the future
* The possibility that some of those options will be awarded to management
* Allowing the company to offer lower salaries and higher options, reducing the amount of financing from VCs that is required, and thus reducing dilution.
* If the options are not all allocated prior to exit, then the entrepreneur has a % of that equity
Any rational entrepreneur will realise that equity put into an options pool is not “lost equity” as in the case of giving it to the VC is.
I would also argue that entrepreneurs working out their equity valuations after a funding round is not particularly useful. They should be considering what their exit valuations will be – which will take account of future funding rounds, liquidation preferences etc.
Michael said on July 15, 2009
Excellent post. This is one of the key areas we at VC Experts stress to individuals searching the Valuation and Deal Terms database. Valuation is critical, but if you don’t understand the terms that drive the valuation, you can be doing harm to your company.
JHL said on July 15, 2009
On “promote”
In the 1980′s in public and private limited partnerships, capital contributions ($ invested) by the limited parners (LPs) and general partner (GP) would be borne 99% by LPs and 1% by the GP. Costs and expenses would be 99/1. Distributions would be 80% to the LPs and 20% to the GP. The 19% was called the promote.
Doc Hargitay said on July 15, 2009
The concept of promote is not a new one, Jeff, and Flybridge is not the one who invented it. This is almost as silly as your piece about the US having a monopoly on entrepreneurship in the world.
Jeff Bussgang said on July 16, 2009
Thanks for the thoughtful comments. Chris is right that the equity in the option pool isn’t “lost”, but it does represent ownership that will no longer be in the control of the founders but instead in the control of the board. I wanted to make sure entrepreneurs get this issue and the notion that pre-money, post-money, option pool and resulting ownership are all factors to weigh when determining the “price” of the deal, not just the pre-money.
Publicus said on July 16, 2009
I think the central logic of the argument is deeply flawed and somewhat troubling. To say, “VCs have an unfair advantage when it comes to financings. They simply have more experience doing deals” is not only self serving, deeply arrogant, and patently untrue, it’s an over generalization to say the least. Rhetorically its like saying the ground is wet therefore it rained. Let’s be a bit more intellectually honest here – VC’s have an unfair advantage when it comes to financing. They have the money and the entreprenuer doesn’t.
Sure it’s true the are plenty of entreprenuers that don’t understand the terms employed in financings but it doesn’t take most smart entreprenuers more than a deal to figure out those terms. Plus any prudent entreprenuer can just go hire a good corporate attorney that’s done just as many deals as the vc in order to level the playing field. I’ve been in the business as both an investor and an entreprenuer for over a decade. The application of the terms may change given market conditions but the terms themselves (dilution, control, preference, etc) haven’t really changed in years. There is plenty of expertise available to offset any VC experience.
VC’s and Entreprenuers are not operating on a level playing field because cash is king. The guy that has it gets to set the terms before giving it to the guy that doesn’t. Nothing wrong with that, it’s called capitalism. However in the meantime why imply the people, those you need in order for you to make money, are not smart enough to figure out a handful of terms that are far less complicated than the products and services they were smart enough to conceive of and build.
Jeff Bussgang said on July 16, 2009
Publicus – thanks for your comment. I did not mean to imply that entrepreneurs are not smart – on the contrary, most entrepreneurs we invest in are smarter than we are! I can only speak from my own experience as a former entrepreneur where even with good legal advice across a number of financings, I didn’t have as sophisticated an appreciation for all the nuances and inter-relationships amongst term sheet terms as I do now having been a VC. It’s my particular experience and that of the tens of entrepreneurs that I’ve spoken to about this topic that inspired the post.
Jim Andelman said on July 16, 2009
I have had the privilege of working with numerous accomplished start-up operators who, despite past successes, were never intimately involved in the financing process at prior companies. These entrepreneurs generally were in fact less experienced and savvy than me when it came to VC financing terms, and I think they’d be the first to admit it.
This may sound crazy, but in my opinion it is the responsibility of the VC to help reduce that asymmetry, so that the rationale for — and effects of — each term in a proposal is well-understood, and the outcome of the negotiation holds no unpleasant surprises. The initial investment (and associated process) forms the basis for a long-term business partnership: it is construed as a zero-sum contest at the VC’s peril. If a VC is successful at “pulling a fast one” on an entrepreneur at funding, it will likely be discovered by the entrepreneur at some point, and could very well result in that entrepreneur caring a little less about being the best steward of that VC’s investment dollars that he/she can possibly be.
I generally suggest to entrepreneurs a few online resources to be reviewed in conjunction with our term sheets, including Brad Feld’s term sheet blog entries (http://bit.ly/17a2oa), this old-but-good Fenwick & West piece (http://bit.ly/16aPCg), and the NVCA term sheet template (http://bit.ly/OAVRf). I have universally found this approach to garner appreciation that pays dividends down the road.
As to the usefulness of this “promote” concept, I agree that it’s better than regarding the pre- in isolation. However, it can still skew a comparison. In your example, it’s unlikely that the options granted by that company over time would be materially different under the two scenarios, even though one scenario has a larger pool. And the capital raised is the same. The “promote” method suggests that the other guy’s deal is slightly better, even though it results in a lower share price and a smaller ownership % for the founders. “Promote” also misses issues like participating vs. non-participating preferred, which can make a much bigger difference across a range of enterprise exit values.
While not so clean and simple, I encourage entrepreneurs to develop for themselves a coarse “return curve”: make some assumptions about future dilution from follow-on rounds, and then calculate what they would get at various enterprise exit values ($10mm, $25mm, $50mm, $100mm, $150mm, etc.). The biggest “aha” is often that, if a team thinks they can get by on a smaller amount of capital, a smaller raise at a lower pre- can actually yield a superior outcome.
westside said on July 20, 2009
The article omits other significant issues which are all mentioned on more entrepreneur friendly posts (see Venture Hacks).
More important that just common ownership (especially at certain exit ranges) are liquidation preferences, whether they are participating or not, drag along rights, etc which all significantly change the outcome.
The most intellectually honest approach would be if a VC would give you an excel model of the proposed financing and the exit value for the investors and common modeling ALL aspects of the term sheet including preferences, dividends, etc.
Very few VCs would give this to you, but if you were able to get this then you’d have higher confidence you are dealing with a very straightforward VC.
elton said on July 23, 2009
doesn’t a 30% option pool also suggest inherent value to the team vs a 20% option pool because there’s more shs to allocate to the future employees and therefore less risk the founders get diluted should 20% be later deemed to be insufficient. if so, your promote analysis isn’t an apples to apples comparison.
Tyler Newton said on July 27, 2009
1. The term “promote” is used frequently by many – this reminds me of when I spent years of my childhood thinking I had made up the saying “hindsight is 20/20″;
2. The returns of the average/median VC fund over the past decade would not lead me to believe that VCs have entrepreneurs over a barrel at all, if anything it would seem to be the other way around.
Newton Manning II said on April 5, 2010
@Tyler: hahaha your commented reminded me of what it was like, I thought I had invented in determinism until I was 15 lol
Muzyka said on July 16, 2011
fantastic post, very informative. I wonder why the other experts of this sector do not notice this. You should continue your writing. I’m confident, you’ve a huge readers’ base already!
Maybell said on September 5, 2011
hello!,I love your writing so so much! percentage we communicate extra about your article on AOL? I require a specialist on this space to solve my problem. May be that is you! Having a look ahead to peer you.