Market Structure Is Causing The IPO Crisis
This post was written by David Weild and Edward Kim, both of whom are capital markets senior advisors with Grant Thornton LLP.
As Congress battles over the shape of financial reform, will it address the lack of a properly functioning market structure? The market for underwritten IPOs, given its current structure, is closed to 80% of the companies that need it. In fact, since 2001 the U.S. has averaged only 126 IPOs per year, with only 38 in 2008 and 61 in 2009 — this compared to the headiness of 1991–2000 with averages of 530 IPOs per year.
Companies can no longer rely on the U.S. capital markets for an infusion of capital, nor can they turn to credit-strapped banks. The result? Companies are unable to expand and grow — they are unable to innovate and compete — so they are left to wither and die, contributing to today’s high unemployment rate.
During the time since our first studies were released, Grant Thornton has received a number of intriguing questions. This post (and the report posted below) addresses them and presents updated data through December 2009, while examining the continued lack of a properly functioning IPO and small cap stock market. The systemic failure of the U.S. capital markets to support healthy IPO and robust small cap markets inhibits our economy’s ability to innovate, create jobs and grow. At a time when America is struggling with double-digit unemployment, the failure of the U.S. capital markets structure can no longer be ignored.
LESSONS LEARNED
1. IPO Crisis worsens: Calendar year 2009 represented one of the worst IPO markets in 40 years. Given that the size of the U.S. economy, in real GDP terms, is over three times what it was 40 years ago, this is a remarkable and frightening state of affairs.
Only 61 companies went public in the United States in 2009, and the trend that disfavors small IPOs and small companies has continued. The median IPO in 2009 was $140 million in size — quite a contrast to 20 years ago when Wall Street commonly executed $10 million IPOs that succeeded.
2. Small business impact: The ramifications of the IPO Crisis extend well beyond the venture capital industry and affect “mom and pop” businesses as well. The non-venture capital and non-private equity segment of the market historically (over more than 20 years) has represented more than 50 percent of all IPOs. The lack of an IPO market is thus hurting small business by cutting off a source of capital (capital realized from going public) that in turn would drive reinvestment and entrepreneurship in the United States. We heard this repeatedly in our discussions.
3. Market structure is at fault — The IPO Crisis is primarily a market-structure-caused crisis, the roots of which date back at least to 1997. The erosion in the U.S. IPO market can be seen as the perfect storm of unintended consequences from the cumulative effects of uncoordinated regulatory changes and inevitable technology advances — all of which stripped away the economic model that once supported investors and small cap companies with capital commitment, sales support and high quality research.
4. Casino capitalism: We have interacted with management and portfolio managers of a number of classic, long-term investment firms, including Capital Guardian, Delaware Asset Management, Kaufman Funds, T. Rowe Price and Wasatch Advisors, that invest in small cap companies. These investors confirm that the current stock market model forces Wall Street to cater to high-frequency trading accounts at the expense of long-term investors, and that Wall Street is increasingly out of touch with the interests and needs of long-term equity investors. Specifically, we have heard that the quality of research on Wall Street has deteriorated dramatically while, in comparison, institutional investors’ quality of in-house research is now “much better.” We also have heard that more investment-oriented portfolio managers are more likely to be treated as “C” accounts (Wall Street may rank accounts as “A,” “B” or “C”; most resources are given to the so-called “A” accounts).
5. Crisis started before Sarbanes-Oxley (2002): The IPO Crisis was not induced by Sarbanes-Oxley, Regulation Fair Disclosure or NASD Rule 2711 (separation of banking and research). Each of these changes occurred well after the IPO Crisis was underway. While we believe these well-intentioned investor protections may have raised the costs of going public (and taking companies public), they did not cause the abandonment of the investment-centric Wall Street model (that also supported small cap companies and thus IPOs) in favor of a high-frequency trading model.
6. Origins of crisis obscured by Dot-Com Bubble (1997): The IPO Crisis began during, but was hidden by, the Dotcom Bubble. We see a clear decline in the number of smaller IPOs beginning in the 1996/1997 time frame, which aligns perfectly with the introduction of the Manning and Order Handling Rules. In addition, we spoke with the CEO of a firm that was active in small cap IPOs in the heart of that time frame. He shared that “the handwriting was on the wall that the combination of trading changes that were being contemplated was going to destroy support for small cap stocks.”
7. This equity crisis exacerbates the credit crisis: Good credit starts with a layer of equity. Companies are less able to attract debt capital or credit when they have inadequate equity capital. The IPO Crisis is creating an equity crisis companion that is exacerbating the credit crisis.
8. A dysfunctional IPO market fuels unemployment: In addition to negatively impacting the number of publicly listed companies in the United States, our current market structure is having a deleterious effect on job creation. When companies cannot raise capital efficiently — or at all — they are deprived of their ability to acquire the assets and human resources they need to grow their businesses. If we want to stop this vicious cycle of rising unemployment and its devastating impact on U.S. citizens, we must take steps now to revive our IPO markets.
You can download the entire report by clicking here
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bob said on June 21, 2010
Capital markets senoir advisors at Grant Thorton what would they know about capital markets other than doing studies from the past. Crappy companies shouldn’t go public and the4 market penalizes those that try. Tell them to study 1975 one deal happened. The ipo market didn’t end then and will not end now. These people are a bunch of academics who have never worked in the capital markets.
David Weild said on June 21, 2010
Bob,
We have spent our entire careers in capital markets. If you took the time to look into our backgrounds, you’d find that we (the authors) are anything but academics. I ran equity capital markets for many years at Prudential Securities where my group worked on upwards of a thousand IPOs, follow-ons, converts and assorted other equity offerings, including REITs and closed-end funds. I then headed corporate finance and was vice chairman of The NASDAQ Stock Market. I ran the strategic planning committee for a time with responsibility for banking, equity research, institutional sales and trading while at Prudential Securities. My co-author, Ed Kim, worked in equity research, equity trading, equity capital markets and investment banking at a number of bulge bracket and major bracket Wall Street firms.
If you want to have an intelligent conversation, then contact me. My email is in the back of the report.
DW
Mateo said on June 22, 2010
This is actually a very insightful report and I wish it were more broadly read. If one views the basic economic purpose of capital markets as the allocation of capital to the highest growth opportunities then it is hard to argue that the capital markets have achieved their purpose in the last ten years.
This should be incredibly obvious, but large numbers of jobs are created when small companies grow into large ones. When these companies can’t get access to capital they can’t grow.
Plenty of companies went public that shouldn’t have, but when you do a broad statistical analysis like the Grant Thornton report it does reveal that something is more fundamentally wrong with Wall Street. (once again that should be pretty obvious by now)
Dale B. Halling said on June 22, 2010
David,
The accounting profession keeps repeating that SOX has nothing to do with IPO downturn. However, the facts are clear. First the US is the only major country to have fewer public companies today than a decade ago. In 1996 the US had 60% of the world IPOs, by 2005 we had 20%. The cost of complying with SOX is around $4M a year and this cost has result in numerous US companies going private and many foreign companies withdrawing from the US public markets. Mercedes Benz just recently delisted from US public markets.
No amount of obfuscation on the part of the accounting profession, is going to change the fact that SOX has caused untold damage to the US economy. Sarbox has failed to achieve any of its goals and is killing US innovation (see http://hallingblog.com/2010/01/04/sarbanes-oxley-obstructing-innovation/). In 1996 the US had 60% of the worldwide IPOs in 2005 we had only 20%. Unfortunately, SOX is just one of several laws since 2000 we have passed that are killing innovation in the US. The incredible innovation of the 90s was based on technology start-up companies built on intellectual capital, financial capital, and human capital. All three of the pillars have been under attack since 2000. Our patent laws have been weakened reducing the value of intellectual capital. Sarbanes Oxley has made it impossible to go public reducing financial capital for start-ups and the FASB rules on stock options have made it harder to attract human capital to start-ups. The Decline and Fall of the American Entrepreneur: How Little Known Laws and Regulations are Killing Innovation http://www.amazon.com/Decline-Fall-American-Entrepreneur-Regulations/dp/1439261369/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1262124667&sr=8-1, explains these problems in more detail.
bob said on June 22, 2010
If you think Pru was an investment bank congrats 1000 ipo’s right, they were barely in that many syndicates much less even co-manged business, and how come you don’t list the firms your associate was at ?
Yuri Ammosov said on June 22, 2010
Manning and Order Handling Rules — can you expand on that? How and why does this particular rule distort the market so much?
Simon said on June 23, 2010
Great article and report guys. I found it very informative.
jeff said on June 23, 2010
While Bob’s tone may be a bit harsh, I think his main point is pretty much on. Good companies can go public, there just aren’t that many good companies. I don’t think unprofitable companies in the main should be going public, and thus saying that the lack of an IPO market deprives the markets of growth capital isn’t really relevant. I think the structural change in the market that has happened is more a result of discriminatory hedge funds as marginal buyers (if you have been on a road show in the past 5 years you will notice the stark difference in discerning questions by investors), versus large mutual funds that played a portfolio game with indifference to specific companies in the 90′s. In the long run, this is healthy for public investors. It would be interesting to add to your report the returns of buying and holding IPO’s since the 90′s. I suspect it would be a relatively dismal outcome — particularly if you excluded a few names that tilt the returns considerably.
Never fear, risk capital is a plenty and will find those businesses that deserve it.
Kurtis Fechtmeyer said on June 28, 2010
I would argue that FD, 2711 and SarBox were bigger contributors to the IPO demise than David’s report indicates. Securities rules are very draconian generally, because fraud kills markets. However, the criminalization of accounting conventions took things a step further, and we learned today what many of us suspected: a key section related to the SarBox was unconstitutional. Officers and Directors have one response today when asked by their investors to go public: why take the risk? Public market investors were traditionally happy with returns in the 10%+ range. Private Equity investors have a 20% IRR hurdle (at least). Which one is more favorable to capital formation and job growth ?