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Observations for the SEC
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The following is excerpted from an email from David Weild to a senior SEC official, part of an ongoing discussion. Thank you for the quick response and the thoughts of your colleagues. Let’s diverge for a moment from the question of accounting costs. The reason why we care about the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley and the accounting profession is because it affects the “health” of the IPO market. This begs the question: What is the “absolute health” of the IPO market in the United States compared to prior years? Answer: The “absolute health” of the US IPO market leaves much to be desired. We ran the attached analysis of IPO Issuance Broken Down By Transaction Size (1991 to 2007 YTD). The document carries an internal title of “The IPO Market Has Been Compromised: What can be done to reverse the damage?” We used a “pure” census of corporate offerings (companies “listed” on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX) in the United States from 1991 to 2007 YTD (September 25). The sample set is “pure” in the sense that it excludes SPACs (blank-check companies), business development companies, closed-end funds, REITs and limited partnerships to focus on operating companies. We have identified two periods: ”Pre-bubble” (1991-1996) and “Post-bubble” (2001-2007). The period of the “Bubble” is in between these two periods. As the exhibit makes obvious (I’m sure you’ll agree), smaller IPOs (those in the $0 to $75 million range) are very much under-represented (one could say nearly “wiped out”) post-Bubble. Given the fact that venture capital and private equity funds have in the aggregate much more capital to invest than they did in the pre-bubble period, a “reasonable man” would expect that the number of IPOs in the post-Bubble period should be higher (not lower). The question of why the number of IPOs is not higher, fully six years after the Bubble, is an important question. I submit that there is no question that accounting costs and Sarbanes-Oxley costs are a primary (maybe not the only) factor in the diminution of initial public offerings in the United States. We know this because over the last several years we have consistently heard from private equity and venture capital professionals that they are forced to sell companies to acquirers because the hurdle to go public has been raised. According to the SEC’s website under “What we do”, the SEC states that its mission is three-fold:
“Capital formation” starts with the initial public offering of operating companies as a founding pillar (the other two being entrepreneurs and venture funding) of US innovation, economic growth, technology leadership and job formation. While the SEC has made great strides in protecting investors and creating efficient markets (some would say “overly” efficient markets given that “traders” have increasingly displaced “investors.”), the SEC has gone backwards in its mission to facilitate capital formation through IPOs. Anecdotal evidence of policies that, rather than “facilitate” capital formation, may actually be inhibiting IPO capital formation can be seen in the current tsunami of interest in creating institutional-only 144A marketplaces to circumnavigate the IPO market (e.g., NASDAQ’s “Portal,” Goldman Sachs’ “GSTrUE,” “Restricted Stock Partners” and “OPUS-5″). My reactions to the specific thoughts of your colleagues:
By way of background for your colleagues, Al Berkeley (Chairman & CEO of Pipeline Trading and former President of NASDAQ), Wick Simmons (former Chairman and CEO of NASDAQ) and Prof. John Coffee are all on the Board of our sister-company. Capital Markets Advisory Partners or “CMA Partners” is led by four principals who have 100 years of combined practical experience in equity capital formation. In addition to understanding market structure (and the regulatory process) through time spent at NASDAQ (then controlled by the NASD), we have each spent many years working within equity capital markets groups at major Wall Street firms and have drafted, structured, marketed, priced and traded hundreds of IPOs, follow-ons and other equity-related instruments. We help issuers and financial sponsors achieve better outcomes in the capital markets. As indicated, I did post the body of the prior email I sent to you on Private Equity Hub which is frequented by many in the Venture and Private Equity communities. There are several comments already which you might like to see. I have received additional comments which, with permission, I will forward along as I believe they also shed “real world” insight into these issues. Best Regards and with Great Respect for the Staff at the SEC, Dave Weild
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March 26th, 2009 at 1:41 pm
[...] In the late 1990’s, in response to the obvious financial shenanigans of large companies like Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, Washington handed us the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. I have no idea how affective Sarbanes has been at reducing fraud (it obvious did not prevent our current economic malaise), but I do know one thing. Sarbox created a significant burden and tax on small companies that desired to tap into America’s public capital markets, and one that could have long-lasting negative impact on the long-term success of startups and innovation in America. It’s pretty simple, Sarbanes-Oxley can costs $2-3mm to implement, and also is a huge burden on your IT and development staff (taking away from feature expansion and product improvement). For a company doing $50mm in revenue with a 10% pre-tax operating margin, you only have say $6mm in after-tax earnings to report. These new Sarbox costs effectively cut your total profitability in half, which has a huge impact on valuation. Of course, what this in fact causes is companies to feel the need to be much, much larger before they even try to go public. Notably, IPOs have been systematically reduced post-Sarbox, and we are still significantly below 1991-1992 pre-bubble levels. As David Weild notes for PEHub, “I submit that there is no question that accounting costs and Sarbanes-Oxley costs are a prima… [...]